


~~SENSITIVE~~

CIA/ SAVA / WIND 700502



## WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

*Week Ending 2 May 1970*

NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.

*For the President Only*


~~Top Secret~~

## SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS

1968-1970


Weekly average  
for each month

■ 1968 — 1969 ● 1970





OCTOBER 1969-APRIL 1970

Weekly data as reported, Feb-Mar-Apr  
Weekly average per month, Oct-Jan





**US BATTLE DEATHS**

increased to 115 from last week's 94.





**SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS**

remained about the same at 300 compared to last week's 294. The official total will change as late reports are received and will be lower than figures released to the press by the GVN.





**INFILTRATORS DETECTED IN PIPELINE**

stand at zero for the second successive week. The total number of infiltrators detected since 23 October 1969 remains at some 59,000 to 60,500.





**ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS**

continued at a high level, rising to 918 from last week's 843.



**ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION**

rose sharply to 3,415 against last week's 2,368.



**SOUTH VIETNAMESE EFFECTIVENESS**

as measured by the percentage of enemy killed by RVN forces was up to 62% over last week's 57%.

Dotted line shows current average for April 1970

Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

Enemy Activity

The expected May phase of the Communists' spring campaign began on 30 April, as enemy-initiated activity increased sharply in I, III, and IV Corps. This rise in activity was generally confined to shellings of remote military outposts and provincial towns. As anticipated, the attacks were of less intensity than those of the April "surge." Their timing, which varied from area to area, seems to have been dictated by local tactical decisions rather than through centralized coordination. The Communists will probably attempt to maintain this higher level of activity for the immediate future.

Allied operations into Communist sanctuaries in the "Fishhook" and "Parrot's Beak" areas of Cambodia have met little resistance so far as the enemy continues to avoid major combat. Successful air strikes over the weekend appear to have resulted in heavy enemy materiel and personnel losses. The tempo of military activity in the interior of Cambodia has decreased; but the Communists are maintaining their pressure with limited, harassing attacks against government positions and key lines of communication in widely separated areas.

In northeast Laos, friendly forces are still holding their own against the Communists, who still seem to be continuing preparations for a major offensive against the Meo and MR II Headquarters complex around Long Tieng. In northwest Laos, the enemy has virtually cleared government forces from the area north of the Mekong above Luang Prabang. The Communists have captured the province capital of Attapeu in the southern panhandle and threaten other government positions on the Bolovens Plateau.

Enemy Infiltration

For the second successive week, no new enemy infiltration groups were detected in the pipeline. It has now been nearly four weeks since Hanoi has started a battalion size group southward. Transportation facilities remain in place in Laos, however, and the Communists could renew infiltration at any time, if they should choose to do so. For the first four months of 1970, an estimated 40,000 personnel began infiltrating into the south as compared to approximately 64,000 in 1969.

South Vietnam Developments

Considerable concern is being expressed among South Vietnamese observers about the political situation in South Vietnam, which they are increasingly prone to describe as deteriorating largely because of the Thieu government's inability to deal effectively with its growing problems. Inflation is putting a sharp economic squeeze on those with fixed incomes, including lower level personnel in the military and civil service. In its present mood, the National Assembly is not likely to give President Thieu the emergency powers he wants in the economic field. Militant students continue to clash with the police. Opposition politicians are reportedly planning to stimulate renewed agitation by the disabled veterans despite government plans for increased benefits for them. Public levying (by Senator Chuc) of corruption charges against three senior generals has embarrassed the government in an area where it must move cautiously in order to avoid losing the confidence and support of ranking military officers. It would be inaccurate to describe the current situation as a crisis, but a peckish mood of malaise does seem to be spreading. Continuing efforts by Thieu's opposition and the Communists to exploit and exacerbate unrest can be expected in the coming months. Thieu has expressed strong disappointment in the performance of some of his key officials, and he may attempt to divert some of the current criticism by a cabinet reshuffle in the near future.

With the exception of the dissident students and a few opposition politicians, the decision to attack the enemy sanctuaries in Cambodia has met with the general approval of prominent politicians and labor leaders in Saigon. Most agreed that the attacks would have a favorable effect upon the course of events in South Vietnam, although some expressed concern that U.S. domestic opinion might not support the move, or that the Communists might fall back and take Phnom Penh.

Communist Developments

Hanoi has sharply denounced the U.S. air action in North Vietnam and allied ground action in Cambodia, but has given little concrete indication of how it intends to respond. Hanoi has called the air strikes "intolerable" and hinted that it might now view the 1968 "understanding" as a dead letter and thus no longer consider itself under any restraints in respect to the DMZ or attacks on South Vietnamese cities. It also

predicted that the Paris talks will be "seriously affected." While Communist rhetoric concerning the Cambodian action has been harsh and sometimes vitriolic, it also has been non-committal on specific counter-measures. Hanoi's recent actions suggest, however, that for the time being it intends to downgrade even the prospect of negotiations in favor of wider military pressure and tough talk. Le Duc Tho and Pham Van Dong have returned to Hanoi following their consultations in China and the USSR, and presumably a policy review will get under way when Le Duan arrives from Moscow.

~~Top Secret~~